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Abstract. This article discusses how the developments in game theory and social choice 
theory profoundly transformed our understanding and modeling of social rationality 
in the social sciences due to the erosion of the concept of social optimum. I discuss the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma and relevant examples of social situations, analyze the difficulties that 
arise when games are repeated, and finally, check how the main results of social choice 
theory influenced our understanding of the “best” social outcome.
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1. Introduction
One of the long-lasting byproducts of the Age of Enlightenment was 
the confidence in social rationality and linear progress. Bernard Mandeville 
(1705) firmly believed that individual vices necessarily produce social good. 
In Adam Smith’s (1776) more refined analysis, the concept of an “invisible 
hand” represented the universal mechanism of aggregating multitudes of 
individual activities. Unconstrained markets were smart and good. Selfishly 
motivated actions were automatically and miraculously converted by markets 
into “optimal,” or at least “near-optimal,” social outcomes – this was an implicit 
* The author is grateful for comments to Barbara Kataneksza. The support of the Center 
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meaning of “social rationality.” The forces of competition and the interplay of 
demand and supply were inevitably pushing selfishly motivated bakers, butch-
ers and brewers into delivering products for everybody’s benefit.
The first half of 20th century brought a better understanding of the concepts 
of social rationality and social optimum. Pareto (1906) substituted a vague 
Bentham’s (1780) idea of the “greatest happiness of the greatest number” with 
a precise definition that in a socially optimal outcome, nobody can be made 
better off without making somebody else worse off. These were minimal con-
ditions since, in a typical economic setting, there are many such outcomes 
(called Pareto-optimal). Bergson (1938) introduced what later became known 
as Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function (swf). Any well-defined ethical 
or economic evaluation of social outcomes would produce its own Bergson-
Samuelson swf that would assign higher numerical values to more preferred 
outcomes. If there were consensus in a society on its ethical and economic prin-
ciples, the relevant swf would provide a perfect implementation of those prin-
ciples and a measuring rod for the corresponding concept of social rationality.
The optimism of Scottish Enlightenment was attacked over the 19th and 
20th centuries both by ideologically motivated socialists and communists, and 
by the rightist supporters of corporate state. However, the decisive blows to 
Smith’s elegant intellectual construction were slowly hammered out by ideo-
logically neutral developments in microeconomics that were soon represented 
in more formal ways in two subfields of applied mathematics, game theory 
and social choice theory.
An implicit – and problematic – assumption behind Smith’s and simi-
lar approaches was the lack of interdependence among individual decisions, 
perhaps with the exception of competition among producers. To some extent, 
such an assumption reflected the low complexity of Enlightenment econo-
mies. Uncomplicated markets of bakers, butchers and brewers consisted of 
many small players who were providing simple private goods. If your neigh-
bor bought a loaf of bread at a local bakery then, assuming no shortage, her 
consumption wouldn’t affect your consumption in any way. In other words, 
in Smith’s markets there were no “externalities,” i.e., side costs or benefits for 
players other than those directly involved in an economic transaction. At that 
time, there was no concept of “public goods” as introduced by Samuelson 
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(1954) whose main characteristic was non-rivalrous access to resources such 
as public broadcasting or national defense, and which was later complimented 
by related concepts of club goods (Buchanan 1965) and common-pool re-
sources (Ostrom 1990). For such non-private goods, consumer’s utility could 
be strongly dependent on the actions of other consumers. For instance, if many 
of your neighbors used a community pool at the same time, then the crowd 
would make swimming utterly uncomfortable. If your neighbor switched to 
a public channel on her TV, you could still watch it on your TV. However, 
if nobody paid fees or taxes to support the public broadcaster, your public 
channels would stay dark. This was a more complex economic environment 
than Smith’s markets. In such an environment, it was easily possible to obtain 
Pareto inferior outcomes that would be also non-optimal according to any 
reasonable Bergson-Samuelson swf.
Noncooperative game theory introduced especially useful tools for mod-
eling interdependent decisions that enabled considering more complicated 
situations than Smith’s simple markets. It taught us that humans may be 
locked in a variety of traps that convert their individually rational decisions 
into social disasters. This insight also applies to, but is not limited to, certain 
markets. Sometimes, unconstrained markets may lead to overexploitation 
or undersupply. Further developments in game theory revealed even more 
disturbing difficulties with the concept of social rationality. When interactions 
are repeated with sufficient intensity, in many games stable cooperation is 
in equilibrium. However, the range of equilibrium behavior may vary from 
total cooperation to total defection. In other words, if equilibrium is a proxy 
for social rationality, too many various types of behavior can be labeled as 
“socially rational” to make such a label useful. Finally, social choice theorists 
established that even if we assume the existence of a benevolent and wise 
decision maker willing to take into account the preferences of everybody in 
order to reach social optimum, the conversion of individual preferences into 
smart social solutions faces unsolvable difficulties. According to social choice, 
the very concept of “social optimum” is problematic. 
The present chapter discusses how the developments in game theory and 
social choice theory deeply transformed our understanding and modeling of 
social rationality in the social sciences due to the erosion of the concept of 
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social optimum. I discuss the Prisoner’s Dilemma and relevant examples of 
social situations, analyze the difficulties that appear when games are repeated, 
and finally examine how the main results of social choice theory affected our 
understanding of the “best” social outcome.
2. Game theory and tensions between individual  
and social rationality
The milestones in the formal development of game theory were von Neu-
mann’s (1928) proof of the existence of minimax solution in two-player zero-
sum games and von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) comprehensive 
blueprint for the future development of the discipline. In the most important 
type of game, strategic game, two or more players independently make deci-
sions (choose their “strategies”) and the results of their individual choices 
result in certain payoffs for all of them. Players are interested in their own 
payoffs only and prefer higher payoffs to lower ones. 
One of the first games that generated a lot of interest was the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD), first described by RAND mathematicians Flood and Dresher, 
and popularized with an eye-catching interpretation by another mathemati-
cian, Albert Tucker (Flood, 1950; Tucker 1952). This simple game describes 
the quintessential problem that may arise when individual decisions lead to 
an important social outcome.
The Tucker’s story unfolds as follows. Don and Tom, two robbers, were 
caught by police. They are held incommunicado and expect to be charged. 
They care only about their own sentences; they can stay mute (cooperate with 
each other) or testify against their partner (defect). The prosecutor describes 
to Don the consequences of his decisions: if they both stay mute, there is 
not enough evidence for a serious charge and they are charged with a minor 
crime. Both inmates get one year in prison. If one of them testifies, the other 
one is convicted entirely on the strength of such testimony with a three-year 
sentence. The testifying inmate gets free. If they both testify, such testimonies 
are relatively less valuable and both sentences are two years. Then the prosecu-
tor presents a symmetric scenario to Tom. 
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Games like the PD are most conveniently represented in a matrix form. 
The rows correspond to Don’s (Player 1’s) strategies and the columns cor-
respond to Tom’s (Player 2’s) strategies. The numbers at the intersection of 
some row and column represent the payoffs that Don and Tom respectively 
obtain from playing the corresponding strategies. Since both players prefer 






Mute –1, –1 –3, 0
Testify 0, –3 –2, –2
Figure 1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
The dilemma is constituted by two facts. 
1. First, testifying is a dominant strategy, i.e., it is always better to testify 
than to stay mute. This is the concept of individual rationality employed in 
the PD. To see this, let’s consider Don’s decisions assuming that he cannot 
influence in any way Tom’s decisions. If Tom stays mute, then Don breaks 
free for testifying versus getting one year for staying mute; if Tom testifies, 
then Don gets two years for testifying and three years for staying mute. Tom’s 
situation is analogous. 
2. Second, when both inmates testify, they both get higher payoffs than 
when they stay mute: two years versus only one year. 
As an effect, in the PD individual rationality leads to Pareto-inferior out-
comes since both players could get higher payoffs under a different strategy 
profile. Both Don and Tom always want to testify; when they do, they are 
worse off than when they both stay mute. 
In the generic version of PD, the strategy ‘testify’ is usually called ‘defect’ 
(D) and ‘mute’ is called ‘cooperate’ (C). The dilemma is between individual 
rationality that recommends defection and looking for social benefits from 
cooperation. Since individual rationality leads to inefficient outcomes, the 
PD provides an example of situation when an invisible hand doesn’t work. 
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While the prison interpretation of the PD made the game attractive to 
present to a lay audience, it obscured its enormous importance and universal 
applicability. If the PD were a curiosity, its place wouldn’t be at the center of 
political science and economics. And the applications of the PD are massive. 
PD was essentially the game played by the USA and the Soviet Union in the 
arms race. From applying PD we can learn that we do not need to assume 
that the opponents must be “evil”: the structure of interactions forces them 
into defection. When we extend the basic model to many players, PD-like 
situations appear in global warming and other environmental problems, the 
formation of interest groups or the provision of all public goods and services. 
Even the most fundamental problem of humans forming a society versus total 
anarchy has arguably the structure of the PD!
The empirical problems resulting from the PD-like games motivated high-
profile work in political science, economics, sociology and psychology that 
focused on modeling the tension between individual and social rationality. 
The situations involving such tensions were called collective action problems, 
the tragedy of the commons, social traps or social dilemmas (Olson 1965, 
Hardin 1968, Platt 1973, Dawes 1980). Especially important were extensions 
of the PD to multi-player games that retain its fundamental properties. PD 
can be extended in a variety of ways. In our next example, we will follow one 
possible path for one specific problem. Let’s face the following problem of 
pollution in a big city: 
Automobile pollution: In Los Devils, where automobile pollution is a big 
problem, annual benefits from clean air are estimated to be equal to $1000 
per person. A pollution-control filter costs $100. We know that: 
(a) the city’s population is 1 mln and everybody has one car; 
(b) everybody pollutes equally and the benefits are proportional to the 
number of filters; 
(c) status quo payoff (no filters) is zero.
Every strategic game includes, as its components, players, strategies and 
payoffs. Let’s reconstruct those components:
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1. Players: 1 mln car owners;
2. Strategies: 1 (cooperate, buy filter), 0 (defect, do not buy filter);
3. Payoff of Player i (measured in dollars): Pi(s) = r(s)/1000 – 100×si, where 
r(s) is the total number of cooperators when the strategy profile is s and 
si is Player i’s strategy.
Let’s consider our player’s payoffs from the two available strategies when 
the number of initial cooperators is r. When Player i defects, his payoff is equal 
to r/1000 since he doesn’t have to buy the filter. When he decides to cooper-
ate, his payoff is equal to (r+1)/1000 – 100 since he must pay 100 for the filter 
and he becomes one more cooperator. The difference between both payoffs is 
99.999. The extra benefits to a player from his own cooperation (buying the 
filter) are practically negligible while the cost of cooperation is high. Thus, the 
incentive to defect is very strong. Defection is a dominant strategy, i.e., you 
are always better off if you defect.
Similarly to the two-player PD, not only both players have dominant 
strategies but also the equilibrium in dominant strategies is inefficient. To 
check the second fact let’s denote the strategy profile of all cooperators ALL 
C and all defectors ALL D:
Pi(ALL C) = 1000000/1000 – 100 = 900
Pi(ALL D) = 0
When everybody plays the individually rational strategy ‘defect’, every-
body gets the payoff of 0. When everybody cooperates, everybody’s payoff is 
900. The substantial difference represents a potential gain from cooperation 
that is forfeited in the inefficient Nash equilibrium (see Figure Automobile 
Pollution). The lower line in the figure represents payoffs from cooperation; 
the upper line represents payoffs from defection. The fact that we do not have 
the continuum of players as well as the continuum of values is neglected. The 
dots at the ends of lines mean that we cannot have 1 mln cooperators if Player 
i defects (in such a case 999999 is the maximum) or no cooperators if Player 
i cooperates (we must have at least one cooperator).
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Figure 2: Automobile Pollution.
Automobile Pollution is another frightening version of the tragedy of 
the commons or a collective action problem. With a large number of play-
ers, achieving cooperation seems hopeless. Every player must pay the cost of 
cooperation but the benefits are spread thinly over a million. 
From the PD perspective, it is surprising that humans so often cooperate. 
Cooperation may be facilitated by a variety of factors. One of them is estab-
lishing new rules of the game that essentially force players into cooperation. 
The rules may be imposed externally by a state or another central authority, 
or they may be self-imposed by interested players on themselves. Such new 
rules are called in political science and economics ‘institutions.’ The theoretical 
recognition of PD and similar games provided the decisive impulse for the 
development of modeling of institutions. One of the most profound contribu-
tions of political science was the discovery and description of the incredibly 
imaginative institutions that players themselves invent in order to get out of 
PD-like situations. In economics, increasingly larger parts of economic theory 
are being converted into the subfield of Industrial Organization that studies 
markets and other institutions that coordinate economic exchange.
In the case of Automobile Pollution, examples of game-changing institu-
tions are easy to imagine. Sanctions may be imposed on car owners or car 
manufacturers that make buying a filter a dominant strategy. Products that 







Erosion of belief in “social rationality” 179
of defection may be effectively removed). Informal social pressure may be 
imposed on carmakers to manufacture only environmentally safe products. 
In general, we model new institutions as modified versions of the original 
ones that have some strategies banned, payoffs changed by sanctions, or that 
were subject to more complex transformations. Cooperation is possible, but 
the road to cooperation is far from straight and easy.
3. Repeated games and theoretical predictive impotence 
In addition to institutional change, a process facilitating cooperation is 
the repetition of the game. It turns out that players may routinely cooperate 
in PD and similar games when the game is repeated. Repeated games are typi-
cally used to model evolutionary behavior, including the evolution of social 
norms or repeated economic exchanges. The developments in the theory of 
repeated games opened its own Pandora Box of surprising effects that deeply 
affected game-theoretic modeling.
In a finitely repeated PD, players play PD a fixed numbers of times and 
the final payoff is a sum of payoffs received in all rounds. In such a game, 
there is no dominant strategy, i.e., against certain strategies of the opponent 
there may exist better strategies than ALL D (always defect). Nevertheless, 
the strategy profile when both players play ALL D constitutes the unique 
Nash equilibrium of the game, or a situation in which no player can improve 
his payoffs by unilaterally changing his strategy. Such a strategy profile is 
the one that a game theorist would be quick to predict to happen. However, 
surprisingly and disturbingly, players seriously deviate from total defection. 
The first experiment with repeated PD (in which the PD was also introduced 
as a game) showed this phenomenon unambiguously (Flood 1952). Out of 
100 rounds, the two subjects participating in the experiment cooperated on 
average in 73 rounds.
The phenomenon of cooperation in finitely repeated games hasn’t been 
explained convincingly so far. One can easily design one’s own simple experi-
ment and run it on any audience with the game of Centipede (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Centipede with three rounds.
Centipede may be considered a simpler version of the repeated PD. It can 
be described as follows: two players start a game with a small endowment: 
Player 1 starts with one dollar while Player 2 starts with nothing. They can 
always continue playing the game or stop it. When a player stops, both players 
collect the prizes that they have accumulated so far. If a player continues with 
the game, she must give up one dollar but the other player simultaneously 
receives two more dollars. 
Centipede is an example of a sequential game. It can be solved by backward 
induction that finds all subgame perfect equilibria, a more restrictive concept 
than the Nash equilibrium. The backward reasoning is as follows: At the last 
stage, Player 2 wins four dollars by stopping and three dollars by going. Thus, 
he chooses stop. Player 1 can predict such action in her last move, and can 
represent her own choice as the one between receiving 3 for stopping and 2 for 
going (because of the predicted choice of Player 2). Thus, Player 1 stops in her 
last move as well. And so on: at every stage both players have incentives to stop. 
In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, Player 1 stops imme-
diately, and in all possible decision situations both players would stop as well.1 
The dilemma is quite similar to the PD. Both players receive in the subgame 
perfect equilibrium the payoffs of 1 and 0, respectively; if they cooperated, 
their payoffs would be 4 and 3, respectively. However, there is a difference 
between the Centipede and the one-shot PD. Experimental subjects, who 
are properly taught the rules of the game, tend to cooperate for a few rounds 
and then they stop one or two rounds before the end. Immediate stopping 
almost never happens!
1 For a comprehensive evaluation and extensions of backward induction see Kaminski 
(2017, 2019)..
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In many games, whenever interactions are repeated a finite number of 
times, cooperation miraculously appears. The troublesome problem for this 
phenomenon is that, while some explanations were offered, none is fully sat-
isfying. Thus, the predictions made by solution concepts that we use in game 
theory to model rational behavior and the actual behavior in Centipede and 
similar games are at odds.
In infinitely repeated games, another problem emerges. Equilibria are 
numerous and, in many games and under reasonable assumptions, any level 
of cooperation may be achieved in equilibrium. In the 1970s, a number of 
disturbing theorems was proved that confirmed the existence of multiplicity of 
equilibria in repeated games. Those results were called “folk theorems” since 
game theorists long suspected that repeated games have similar properties.
Before we formulate one of the folk theorems, we have to introduce an 
infinitely repeated game created on a basis of a finite one-shot game. It is de-
fined as follows: the players from {1, 2, …, n} are unchanged and non-empty 
strategy sets Si (for i=1,…,n) from the original game are actions that are 
taken at every stage of repetition. The payoff functions are typically defined 
as a weighted sum of partial payoffs obtained at consecutive stages. Let s be 
a strategy profile such that at stage k players choose actions sk = (sk1 ,… , s
k
n). 
Then the partial payoff of player i at stage k is equal to Pi(s
k), where Pi is player 
i’s payoff function in the original game. The total payoff in the entire repeated 
game is equal to an infinite sum of discounted partial payoffs:
Pi(s) = ∑i=1,2,… r
i-1 Pi(s
k) 
where 0<r<1 is a discount parameter. Since the discount parameter is between 
zero and one, and the payoffs in a finite one-shot game are limited, the series 
always converges to a finite number. 
While versions of folk theorems can be formulated for any finite game, 
repeated PD received most attention from game theorists and the formulation 
is especially simple in this case. Let p denote the general payoff from mutual 
cooperation (corresponding to -1 in Figure 1) and q denote the general payoff 
from mutual defection (corresponding to -2).
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Folk Theorem [Friedman 1971]. In the repeated PD, when the discount 
parameter is sufficiently high, any vector of payoffs (x,x), where q ≤ x ≤ p, may 
be reached in a subgame perfect equilibrium.
In other words, by varying the discount parameter, we can find a full 
range of equilibria: from such that both players only defect to such that both 
players only cooperate! The equilibrium concept, as a predictor for what will 
happen in a game, is under such circumstances useless.
Folk theorems provided researchers with incentives to go beyond simple 
analysis of equilibrium existence and to model outcomes in repeated games 
with the use of computer simulation. Certain results, both empirical and 
theoretical, suggested that cooperation may be somehow privileged against 
defection. Axelrod (1984) published a book that, among others, included the 
results of his PD ‘tournaments.’ He asked a number of game theorists to submit 
computer programs generating strategies in the repeated PD, and then played 
them pairwisely against each other. The simplest examples of such strategies 
are ALL D (Always defect) and ALL C (Always cooperate) but a strategy can 
be much more complex since it can take into account the information about 
all previous moves of both players. A strategy TFT (“tit-for-tat”) submitted 
by Anatol Rappoport (who was one of two subjects in the first PD experiment 
ever played) proved especially successful. TFT starts with cooperation and 
then repeats the previous action of the opponent, i.e., responds with C to C 
and with D to D. TFT won the first tournament, i.e, it received the highest 
average payoff, and then, even when its success was revealed to the partici-
pants, it won the second tournament. TFT is not a dominant strategy since 
no such strategy exists in a repeated PD. Moreover, because of its cooperative 
character it cannot even win against any other strategy in a pairwise contest. 
Nevertheless, it seems to be very efficient in generating high average payoff 
across large environments consisting of many various strategies.
The privileged status of cooperative strategies in Axelrod’s experiments 
motivated researchers to include additional variables into modeling repeated 
interactions. One of such variables was the ‘robustness’ of a strategy, i.e., in-
formally, the minimal proportion of such strategies in the population that 
guarantee the existence of equilibrium. Bendor and Swistak (1997) confirmed 
that equilibria based on cooperative strategies, such as the TFT, are most robust. 
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The less efficient the strategy (in terms of cooperation), the less robust it is, 
i.e., frequent defectors require higher proportions to defend against intrusion. 
This means that frequent defectors can be destabilized by a small change in the 
population. This is the essence of the evolutionary advantage of cooperation.
Despite all results suggesting a special character of cooperative strategies 
in repeated PD, the wide range of potential equilibria remains a disturbing 
phenomenon.
4. Social choice theory and the problems with aggregation  
of preferences
The motivating questions of social choice theory differ from those of game 
theory. Instead of asking ‘what happens when rational players make independ-
ent decisions?,’ social choice enquires about the properties of various methods 
of making social decisions, principles of distributive justice or the existence of 
methods satisfying certain properties (Arrow 1951, Sen 1969, Lissowski 2013). 
The seeds of social choice theory were in the work of a French mathematician, 
social scientist, and, incidentally, one of the fathers of the Enlightenment, mar-
quis Nicolas de Condorcet. Condorcet studied the Estates-General, the French 
pre-revolutionary parliament and its three main blocs of voters constituted by 
clergy, nobility and the others: bourgeoisie, wage-laborers and the peasantry. 
He noticed that voter preferences of the three groups could form a very curious 
pattern. When paired with majority rule, such a pattern produced paradoxes.
Let’s assume that we have three voters (or homogenous groups of voters 
of roughly equal size) that are numbered simply 1, 2 and 3. There are three 
alternative policies on crime that can be implemented x, y, and z (e.g., spending 
more on police force, building more prisons and spending more on preven-
tion). The preferences of voters in the Condorcet profile are listed below from 
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Under such preferences, Players 1 and 3 prefer x to y; 1 and 2 prefer y 
to z; 2 and 3 prefer z to x. Thus, for every alternative, there is a majority that 
prefers something else to it. We have a cycle:
x P y P z P x
where xPy means that a majority of voters prefers x to y. 
When three alternatives are at stake, voting by majority is impractical 
since – as demonstrated by the Condorcet Paradox – a possible outcome 
would be that no alternative receives majority. Thus, voting by majority over 
three and more alternatives is potentially indecisive. Parliamentary proce-
dures solve this problem by making consecutive alternatives compete with 
each other pairwisely according to a pre-specified agenda. However, such 
a solution raises a question: which agenda should be used? The question is of 
an utmost practical importance since the relation of social preference based 
on pairwise comparisons using majority is, as we established, intransitive in 
cases of a Condorcet profile.
If some agenda setter, say, the House Speaker, can specify the order of vot-
ing, he has a considerable power in hand. If the Speaker would like to make x 
the winner, he could easily create an agenda supporting his wishes. Turning x 
into a winner requires in this case simply that x is added as the last alternative 
to the agenda. The winning agenda for x looks as follows:
1. Vote between y and z;
2. Vote between the winner of Session 1 and x. 
According to the above agenda, denoted formally as yzx, y wins in the 
first round against z, and loses in the second round to x. In our example, any 
alternative can win provided that it is the last one on the agenda.
The Condorcet’s Paradox showed that the naïve interpretation of voting 
as representing “social will” or uncovering some underlying social interest is 
deeply suspect. Voting can be often manipulated, and there are fundamental 
reasons why voting cannot be considered to be as an “objective” method of 
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making social decisions. Over years that followed, many other methods of vot-
ing were discovered and all of them were sooner or later found to have various 
troublesome or paradoxical properties. The next step in the understanding of 
such paradoxes was made when the contemporary discipline of social choice 
was created in mid-20th century by Duncan Black (1958) and Kenneth Arrow 
(1951). Arrow’s work is especially relevant for the present article.
Arrow was a student of a great Polish logician and mathematician Al-
fred Tarski. Arrow’s language developed for social choice theory was based 
on Tarski’s terminology used in his popular logic textbook. Arrow claimed 
that he was not familiar with the Condorcet’s paradox when he started his 
work but his approach could be considered the natural logical extension of 
Condorcet’s problem. 
Let’s assume that a social decision must be made over some number 
of at least three social alternatives. We want to rank the alternatives from 
the best to the worst one, i.e., we want to order them in a transitive fashion 
(we denote this condition by T) using some social decision method F. The 
only information that can be used are preferences of some finite number 
(at least two) voters who may be also indifferent between or among some 
alternatives. An example of such a method would be a dictatorial rule of 
some voter i that simply says “whatever i prefers is also preferred by a so-
ciety.” Certainly, such a voting method wouldn’t be acceptable for most 
social decisions. We are looking for such an F that wouldn’t be dictatorial 
and perhaps satisfy a few simple properties as well. Arrow singled out the 
following properties:
1. Unrestricted domain (U): Our method F is defined for all possible vot-
ing profiles (configurations of voter preferences);
2. Pareto property (P): If everybody prefers x to y, then x must be socially 
preferred to y;
3. Non-dictatorship (D): F is non-dictatorial, i.e., there is no dictator 
among the voters. A voter i is a dictator according to F if for any x and y, 
whenever i prefers x to y, then F must prefer x to y;
4. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): F is based on pairwise 
comparisons only, i.e., if in two voting profiles the individual preferences over 
x and y are identical, then F must rank x and y socially the same way.
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Arrow’s Theorem [1951] : Conditions U, P, D, IIA listed above and the 
requirement of transitivity of social ranking T are inconsistent. 
At least one of the five properties must be violated. For instance, majority 
rule applied to all alternatives violates U since for some preference profiles – 
such as the Condorcet’s profile – there are no majority winners, and we cannot 
even designate the top position in the social ranking. If we modify majority 
by using certain pre-defined agenda and, possibly in some cases, a tie-breaker 
between alternatives, we can satisfy U but IIA will be violated. In general, 
practically all sensible voting methods violate IIA.
Arrow chose conditions that were looking “obvious” and “simple” (his orig-
inal conditions were slightly different from those defined above that became 
later standard in the presentation of Arrow’s Theorem). His point was that 
making social decisions is a complicated and troublesome process, far from 
the naivety of “social physics” and automatic rationality. ‘Social rationality’ 
cannot be modeled by a mechanical utilization of metaphors of optimization 
taken from physics and other natural sciences. No ‘social physics’ is possible. 
If we accept Arrow’s conditions as fundamental, then every method of social 
decision-making must have certain fundamental deficiency or deficiencies. 
This pessimistic statement applies not only to voting but to all other social 
decisions that are based on individual preferences and result in rankings, in-
cluding various policy decisions or welfare comparisons of welfare economics.
Arrow’s work not only won him a Nobel Prize but also started a new 
discipline, where scholars uncovered a large number of similar impossibility 
theorems. Probably the most interesting and important of such results is a theo-
rem anticipated by a philosopher Allan Gibbard (1973) and formally proved 
by a mathematical economist Mark Satterthwaite (1975). The Gibbard-Satter-
thwaite Theorem states formally what many social choice theorists suspected 
since Arrow: practically all voting methods are vulnerable to manipulation. 
Thus, this theorem extends the main point of the Condorcet’s Paradox to all 
voting methods. 
Let’s assume that a voting method V is based on individual preferences of 
a finite number (at least two) of voters over at least three alternatives. In this 
case, V produces not a ranking but a single winner, i.e., a single alternative. 
We make the following assumptions about V:
Erosion of belief in “social rationality” 187
1. Unrestricted domain (UD): V is defined for all possible voting profiles;
2. Non-dictatorship (ND): there is no voter i such that if i’s most preferred 
alternative is x, then x must become the winner selected by V;
3. Range constraint (RC): There are at least three alternatives that, under 
certain preference profiles, are selected by F as winners.
Out of the three properties, the two first ones are straightforward. The 
third one demands a word of explanation. The requirement of RC is in fact less 
demanding than the Pareto condition that appeared in Arrow’s Theorem. The 
Pareto condition would demand in the present context that for every alterna-
tive x, whenever x is preferred unanimously to everything else, then x would 
be the winner. This would mean that every alternative must be sometimes 
a winner and also specify conditions when this must happen. RC demands 
only that we have at least three different winners, and assumes nothing about 
the circumstances under which this must happen.
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [1975]: If the three conditions UD, ND 
and RC are satisfied by V then V must be manipulable. 
Manipulability means that there exists a preference profile such that a cer-
tain voter or voters have incentives to lie about their preferences since this 
misrepresentation would result in the choice of their more preferred alternative. 
In a less normatively loaded terminology, the type of voting resulting from 
misrepresenting one’s preferences is called sophisticated or strategic.
Let’s take a look at our example of Condorcet’s Paradox and the agenda 





The agenda was: vote between y and z, then vote between the winner of 
the first round and x.
Voter 1 has certainly no incentive to vote strategically since x is this voter’s 
top choice. It is left to the reader to check that also voter 3 has no such incen-
tives. With voter 2, the situation is different. Let’s assume that only voter 2 can 
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vote strategically. If 2 votes in the first round for z, his second choice, instead of 
his top choice y, such a vote would make z the winner of the first round. When 
z makes to the second round, it beats x and becomes the overall winner. Thus, 
by voting strategically, voter 2 was able to make the winner his second-best 
choice z instead of his worst alternative x. Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s Theorem 
assures us that for all voting methods that satisfy the truly basic conditions 
1-3, we can find voting profiles that are similarly manipulable.
Like Arrow’s Theorem, Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s Theorem generated a wave 
of work studying various types of manipulation or paradoxes. It turns out that 
problems with the agenda (as those exhibited in the Condorcet Paradox), the 
ubiquity of strategic voting, the manipulation via introducing fake candidates 
or vote trading, gerrymandering (strategic redistricting) or other electoral 
engineering are unavoidable aspects of politics. We cannot free ourselves from 
lying and manipulation simply through electing better candidates for our of-
fices. The incentives for manipulation are present due to the nature of social 
decisions and there will always be politicians who will not miss the opportunity. 
5. How research methodology and policymaking were affected?
The gradual dismantling of Enlightenment optimism about social rational-
ity that happened in the middle of 20th century had substantial consequences 
for the methodology of research studying optimal social outcomes and the 
evaluation of policy outcomes. We can classify methodological reactions as 
business as usual, pessimistic resignation, focus on institutions and fragmenta-
tion. Below I will give examples of all types of reactions.
An example of the business as usual reaction is a cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) that essentially employs the Bergson-Samuelson approach to evaluating 
policy outcomes. CBA used in public sector examines the costs and benefits 
associated with various policy projects. For instance, the construction of a new 
highway may be evaluated taking into account direct costs, environmental 
impact, pollution, disturbances for affected people and various types of eco-
nomic benefits. In short, CBA’s appropriateness stems from using monetary 
estimates that can be justified as well-measurable and additive across affected 
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parts. While problems discovered by Arrow still apply, the crucial Arrowian 
axiom of IIA (see Section 4) loses much of its appeal in this context.
Resignation followed the widespread pessimism about dismal prospects 
for collective action (Olson 1965) and the inevitability of the “tragedy of the 
commons” (Hardin 1968). A possible example – admittedly, a non-falsifiable 
hypothesis – are the problems of NATO with enforcing cooperation among 
its members. Olson and Zeckhauser’s (1966) influential article examined the 
difficulties of NATO with making its members to raise defense spending to 
the level of percent of GDP comparable with the United States. The pessimistic 
conclusion was that a “large” player (United States) is doomed to be cheated 
by “small” players (other members of NATO). As a consequence, the United 
States cannot avoid making disproportionately large contributions to the com-
mon cause. Motivated by the authors’ desire to show a persuasive example 
of a collective action problem (Zeckhauser 2015), the article quickly became 
a required reading for practically all graduate students of political science 
and public policy in the United States. Its pessimism very likely discouraged 
American government officials and policy analysts from pressing the allies to 
increase their defense spending.
Nudging NATO allies to spend more on defense by President Donald 
Trump provides a good example of the next reaction to the pessimism of 
Olson and Hardin, i.e., institutionalism. Trump, the first American president 
with no prior governmental or military experience, was probably not aware 
of the “impossibility” of solving the NATO’s spending dilemma. He threat-
ened with withdrawal of American troops from Europe; moving American 
bases to higher-spending allies; offered public shaming and cold shoulder to 
Chancellor Merkel of Germany; threatened with tariffs on consumer goods; 
made an impression that he was a “mad” decision maker. All those attempts at 
solving the problem were institutional in nature, i.e., he attempted to change 
the rules of the game in order to push the outcome in the desired direction. 
In general, the explicit focus on institutions (described in more detail at 
the end of Section 2) has generated several Nobel Memorial Prizes in Eco-
nomics over the past decades starting with Ronald Coase (1991), Douglass 
North (1993), and Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom (2009). Especially the 
work of Ostrom (1990) provided brilliant theoretical and empirical arguments 
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against the pessimism of Olson and Hardin. While a common resource can be 
overexploited, Ostrom demonstrated how humans in small, local communities 
are surprisingly successful in changing the initial rules of game when manag-
ing fisheries, pastures, oil fields, irrigation systems or forests.
By fragmentation I mean the substitution of the concept of a measurable 
social good with various piecewise analyses that became especially popular 
in voting theory. Since the objective of finding the “best” voting method was 
unattainable, research strategies evolved towards a less ambitious goal of 
partial evaluation of such methods. When Arrow’s work gained recognition, 
a popular research strategy became axiomatic analysis adopted from logic. 
Among its proponents, Amartya Sen received the 1998 Nobel Memorial Prize 
in Economics for related work while Michel Balinski and Peyton Young’s 
results were instrumental for applying the axiomatic method to proportional 
representation algorithms. 
William Riker (1982) famously refuted the “populist” concepts of looking 
for “best” politicians or implementing the “social will,” and defended “liber-
alism” defined as merely rejecting the worst. Another fundamental research 
strategy in voting theory – motivated to some extent by Riker’s minimalist idea 
of rejecting bad options – focused on the evaluation of the extent of paradoxes 
and problems by using computer simulation (Dougherty 2011). While no 
ideal voting method exists, one can try mapping the frequency of a particular 
problem. For instance, voting theorists confirmed by computer simulation that 
simple plurality method (a candidate with most votes wins) often generated 
paradoxical and even dangerous results in presidential elections. Thus, having 
a second round in such elections or using other methods was well justified. 
6. Conclusion
Developments in mathematics of the second half of 20th century, especially 
game theory and social choice theory, demolished many of the Enlightenment’s 
myths of a rosy society being on an auto-pilot of progress. The discovery of 
fundamental problems underlying the concept of social rationality gave im-
pulse to, among others, the rise of institutional analysis that became central 
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for political science and economics, the use computer simulation that helps 
deal with many questions that are not easy to treat analytically, and the ascent 
of experimental methods investigating real-world decision-making.
Game theory, social choice theory and related mathematical approaches 
owe their modeling success to the precision of their mathematical tools and 
minimalistic assumptions. For instance, in strategic games described in Sec-
tion 2, player identities are unimportant (they may be “bakers”, “butchers” but 
also “states” or “voters”) and strategies may come from any nonempty set; any 
preferences over strategy profiles are allowed. This model applies specifically to 
players simultaneously making independent choices (or equivalent situations), 
and having well-defined preferences over different outcomes – and to all such 
cases. We can ask questions such as “Is there any outcome such that no player 
wants to unilaterally change his/her strategy?” An answer will apply universally 
to all relevant empirical cases. Other related questions, such as dealing with coa-
litional opportunities or repeated play, require making additional assumptions 
in our model or using a different formalism. This “minimalism and precision” 
approach led to a development of a number of alternative modeling frameworks 
such as many types of noncooperative and cooperative games, repeated games, 
games with incomplete information, etc. This allowed for shifting the attention 
from providing “one explanation for all social phenomena” towards accurate 
matching empirical phenomena with relevant models.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma and its generalizations, analyzed within the sim-
plest framework of strategic games, destroyed the faith that markets are always 
effortlessly efficient and optimal. In a variety of human interactions, uncon-
strained decisions lead to such inefficiencies as overexploitation, undersupply 
or arms races. Reaching optimality via changing the rules of game, while not 
impossible, may be a difficult and time-consuming task.
Developments in repeated games and evolutionary game theory high-
lighted another troublesome aspect of social interactions. In repeated PD 
and other games, any level of cooperation may be sustainable in equilibrium. 
A troublesome conclusion may come to mind that our predictive power in 
such cases is impotent and “anything may happen.” Surprising good news is 
that more cooperative strategies, such as TFT, have some evolutionary edge 
over less cooperative ones.
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Finally, social choice theory revealed that the very existence of socially 
optimal states couldn’t be taken for granted. Under typical conditions, no 
social decision rule satisfies all basic and reasonable properties that we might 
believe should be satisfied. Also, practically all voting rules are also vulnerable 
to manipulation. Whenever we make social decisions, we have to accept – 
consciously or not, whether we like it or not – tradeoffs between fundamental 
values and principles. 
The pessimism about social rationality inherited with game-theoretic and 
social-theoretic developments had multifaceted impact on research strate-
gies and methodology of policy making. While methods such as cost-benefit 
analysis remained largely unaffected, in other settings widespread pessimism 
labeled certain non-optimal outcomes as inevitable. Nevertheless, institutional 
analysis indicated that while it may be impossible to switch from an equilib-
rium in a game to a non-equilibrium outcome that is Pareto-superior, it is 
possible to change the game itself into one that would generate better outcomes. 
Finally, the by-product of pessimism associated with Arrow’s Theorem was 
the emergence of the axiomatic method and computer simulation methods 
that instead of social optimality, investigated specific desirable properties of 
social decision rules.
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